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Purpose:
Corruption is one of the greatest and most serious social problems our 
country faces today. Slovenia was found to be burdened with systemic or 
structural corruption; therefore, one of its priority efforts should be establishing 
a more effective national structure and taking the most appropriate systemic 
anti-corruption measures. According to the fact that the previous repressive 
reactions against corruption have proven ineffective, it is necessary to pursue the 
objective of its anti-corruption measures aimed at its prevention. One of the major 
measures is the integrity plan, representing a successful breakthrough in the area 
of prevention of corruption, as Slovenia is the first in the European Union to have 
implemented it. Consequently, a research on integrity plans was conducted.
The purpose of the article is to highlight or emphasize the meaning of the 
topical preventive measure in curbing corruption in Slovenia from the perspective 
of public sector institutions which are obliged to elaborate the integrity plan. 
Design/Methods/Approach: 
This contribution is based on methods specific to qualitative research, 
particularly comparative and descriptive ones. Further, the methods of analysis 
and examination of relevant domestic and foreign primary and secondary 
resources and legal acts are used. As a data collection technique, the authors take 
interviews with integrity plan planners and producers. 
Findings:
With regard to the issue at hand, aversion or unwillingness of integrity plan 
producers to participate in our research was found, generally. However, the 
detailed results of the research not only show that the current concept of integrity 
plan should be partially upgraded, but they also reveal that only few leading 
employees participate in elaborating their integrity plan. 
Originality/Value: 
An issue arising from the paper reflects the exceptional endeavor to establish 
a stable prevention national policy. 
UDC: 343.352(497.4)
Keywords: integrity, integrity plan, integrity plan producers, corruption, 
prevention of corruption, Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Slovenia
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Ocenjevanje preventivnih protikorupcijskih prizadevanj v 
Sloveniji
Namen prispevka: 
Korupcija je eden izmed največjih in najresnejših družbenih problemov, 
s katerim se sooča tudi naša država. Za Slovenijo je bilo ugotovljeno, da je 
obremenjena s sistemsko oziroma strukturno korupcijo, zato mora biti eno od 
njenih prednostnih prizadevanj vzpostavitev učinkovitejše nacionalne strukture 
in sprejem čim ustreznejših sistemskih protikorupcijskih ukrepov. Glede na 
dejstvo, da so se dosedanje represivne reakcije v boju zoper korupcijo izkazale 
za neučinkovite, je treba sprejeti ukrepe, ki so preventivno usmerjeni. Eden 
izmed večjih takšnih ukrepov je načrt integritete, ki predstavlja uspešen preboj na 
področju preprečevanja korupcije, kajti Slovenija je prva v Evropski uniji, ki ga je 
implementirala, zato je bila opravljena raziskava o načrtih integritete. 
Namen članka je izpostaviti oziroma poudariti pomen aktualnega 
preventivnega ukrepa pri obvladovanju korupcije v Sloveniji, in sicer z vidika 
institucij javnega sektorja, ki morajo izdelati načrt integritete. 
Metode:
Prispevek temelji na metodah, značilnih za kvalitativno raziskovanje, zlasti 
komparativnih in deskriptivnih. Opravljena sta bila tudi pregled in analiza 
ustreznih domačih in tujih primarnih in sekundarnih virov ter pravnih aktov. Kot 
tehniko zbiranja podatkov so avtorji uporabili intervjuje s snovalci in zavezanci 
za načrt integritete. 
Ugotovitve:
V zvezi z obravnavano problematiko je bilo na splošno ugotovljeno, da obstaja 
pri zavezancih za pripravo načrta integritete odpor oziroma nepripravljenost 
sodelovati v raziskavi. Ne glede na navedeno pa podrobnejši rezultati raziskave 
niso samo pokazali, da je treba sedanji koncept načrta integritete delno nadgraditi, 
temveč so tudi razkrili, da le malo vodilnih delavcev sodeluje pri izdelavi načrta 
integritete. 
Izvirnost/pomembnost prispevka: 
Problematika tega prispevka odraža prizadevanje po vzpostavitvi stabilne 
preventivne nacionalne politike. 
UDK: 343.352(497.4)
Ključne besede: integriteta, načrt integritete, zavezanci za načrt integritete, 
korupcija, preprečevanje korupcije, Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije, Slovenija
1 PROLOGUE
Corruption can be prosecuted after such an offense has been committed, but first 
and foremost it requires prevention (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
[UNODC], 2005). 
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According to Dobovšek (2006, 2012), the goal of each effective strategy 
against corruption is to establish the environment for the prevention of corruption 
or the national system of organizational integrity; therefore, each organization 
should have elaborated its anti-corruption program based on recognition of their 
own vulnerable and exposed activities – i.e., its integrity plan (hereinafter: IP), 
developing adequate and appropriate combination of preventive measures that 
would support effective and quality activities and promote professional behavior 
in the areas particularly exposed to corruption.
In accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
[UNCAC] (Transparency International, 2003), corruption is no longer a local 
issue, but an international phenomenon that affects all societies and economies 
and, in particular, damages democratic institutions, national economies, and 
the rule of law; consequently, international cooperation for its prevention and 
control is needed, as well as a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach 
and consistent implementation of the provisions of such areas, and also technical 
assistance, capacity building and institutional development for its effective 
prevention, detection and suppression – while not neglecting the support and 
involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sector; such as civil 
society, non-governmental organizations and community if we want the efforts to 
be successful (Zakon o ratifikaciji Konvencije Združenih narodov proti korupciji, 
2008). 
As many authors (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado, & Boex, 2007, etc.) 
have found, realization that corruption is a global phenomenon makes it clear that 
the fight against corruption is not an issue of international aid, but rather a matter 
of global subsistence. 
Cockcroft (2012) considers that all forms of activities and efforts in fighting 
corruption, despite the progress made so far, are still underdeveloped and 
believes anti-corruption reform can succeed only with the support by active 
politics. “Without this, all national efforts are meaningless – corruption will become a 
hostage to the growing problems of the 21stcentury.” (Cockcroft, 2012: 9) 
Huther and Shah (2000) argue that in a largely corruption-free environment, 
anti-corruption agencies, ethics offices, and ombudsmen strengthen the standards 
of accountability. In countries with endemic corruption, however, the same 
institutions function in form but not in substance; under a best-case scenario such 
institutions might be helpful, but the more likely outcome is that they help to 
preserve social injustice.
Rose-Ackerman and Truex (2012) assert that real reform in fighting corruption 
requires systemic policy initiatives, but “a clean hands policy” in which wealthy 
countries hold themselves aloof from tainted countries and individuals; without 
doing anything, actually, adressing the underlying problems will simply further 
divide the world into rich and poor blocks. 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2007) have outlined that leadership and political 
commitment is the key for the success of anti-corruption efforts. According to the 
persuasion of the latter, a comprehensive anti-corruption effort needs a double 
pronged approach aiming at controlling the opportunities of corruption by 
curative approaches based on enforcement and prosecution, while simultaneously 
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using a preventive approach that attacks the roots of corruption by adressing the 
system of incentives embedded in the public sector. Furthermore, they emhasize 
that anti-corruption strategies need to be sustainable, comprehensive, adequately 
implemented, and appropriately designed. “But, we need to worry about other 
issues as how to adopt the implementation of a strategy to the particular characteristic 
of developing countries or, indeed, how to generate a genuine desire to fight corruption 
at the highest level of government.” (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007: 221) They 
(Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007) have also found out, that the most common cause 
of unsustainability and failure is the lack of political will to maintain the fight 
against corruption. “Political will against corruption can be supported by (or forced 
from) civil society’s demand from the ‘bottom up’.” (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007: 
222) Nevertheless, comprehensiveness and sustainability of effort are generally 
not sufficient for success. Anti-corruption strategies need to be championed by 
the highest political officers in the country, which means the commitment of the 
office of the president and the entire government cabinet. Political will to fight 
corruption can be generated or reinforced by different stakeholders’ advocacy 
and pressure imposed on the others. To be successful, anti-corruption efforts 
also need to be sustained over time. The international experience shows that 
one of the most common causes of failure in anti-corruption efforts is the lack of 
continuity in effort once the strategy has been put into motion (Martinez-Vazquez 
et al., 2007). “When the most sophisticated and sound anti-corruption strategies and 
institutional strategies are technically in place, their success depends critically on the 
details of their implementation and the facto mechanisms that may bend or weaken the 
strategy to corrupt practices. Where these mechanisms have not been clearly identified, 
anti-corruption efforts may prove futile. Thus, we need to ask not only whether a country 
does undertake a given anti-corruption strategy or measure, but also whether they do it 
correctly.” (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007: 219) 
One of such modern concrete measures of anti-corruption strategies is the 
integrity project, or more precisely, the IP. Dobovšek (2009: 269) points out that 
“the IP is one of the most modern methods to establish legal, ethical, and professional 
quality of work in various governmental and non-governmental organizations. Operating 
with IP is one of the basic precepts of the Slovenian national strategy against corruption”. 
The IP is an important institutional project and instrument an organization applies 
to raise awareness about strong and weak points of its operations, particularly 
focusing on the development and maintenance of its integrity and uncorrupted 
condition. As such, it is a relatively new phenomenon in the public sector (Meško, 
Dobovšek, & Ažman, 2014). But – if the IP is to be one of sustainable anti-corruption 
measures, it must not become just one of cosmetic corrections on paper only. 
Indeed, it is, for this reason, worthwhile to note that the IP requires operational 
integrity or activity, i. e., continuous project teamwork, applying to leadership as 
well – actually, it is inevitable. “In Slovenia, integrity plans have their custodians 
within each and every entity. They are individuals who are accountable for 
preparing, implementing, and constantly evaluating and updating their plans. 
Having such people on their staff enables the Corruption Prevention Commission 
(CPC) to work more effectively” (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013). Dobovšek (2008: 20) argues that “the basis for any IP is a focus 
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on decent and honest behaviours” […] and that “stimulation of integrity relies on the 
dignity of all officials, but the leadership of the institution carries the greatest burden; and 
it is vital that the leading employees set an example within their own organizations”. But 
not only Slovenia, also Serbia is engaged in IP (Transparency International, 2011).
2 THE ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE RELEVANT (PREVENTIVE) 
ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS 
The UNCAC (Transparency International, 2003; UNODC, 2004), in comparison 
with the other anti-corruption conventions against corruption, contains the most 
extensive provisions regarding the methods, means and standards for preventive 
measures in the public and private sector. Second chapter of the UNCAC 
(Transparency International, 2003) is completely dedicated to prevention, 
including measures in the public and private sector, and contains a model of 
the preventive policies, such as the establishment of anti-corruption bodies, and 
ensures transparency of political party funding, etc. (Transparency International, 
2003; UNODC, 2005, 2009).
Meško (2009), similarly, gives a careful consideration to preventive measures. 
She concludes that preventive measures are a necessary and a very important 
factor, and the pro-active development of anti-corruption is needed. Dobovšek 
and Kordež (2005) also find out that a key objective to eliminate corruption is 
prevention, which has recently became a guiding idea of the modern criminal 
policy, and strong endeavours to prevent harmful consequences of corruppt 
practices. 
The Stockholm Agreement (European Commission, 2011a; European 
Council, 2010) states that the best way to reduce the level of crime is to effectively 
prevent its emergence, and the same applies to corruption. In terms of successful 
crime prevention, crime prevention is particularly important, which is defined as 
a professional paradigm for understanding how to most effectively reduce crime. 
Meško (2002) defines it as a planned activity aimed at reducing and removing a 
wide range of opportunities for creating hazards, risks, jeopardy, interference in 
people’s rights, especially setting obstacles to perpetrators to prevent them from 
committing offences while acting against the consequences of “ante delictum” 
and eliminating those situations that could possibly generate crime. 
Previously mentioned authors (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007: 12) have argued 
that “although corruption may be perpetrated by individuals, it takes place primarily 
within an institutional context – but people, not institutions, engage in corruption”. 
The European Commission [EC], in terms of strengthening the political will 
to tackle the problem of corruption in all Member States, announced publication 
of an anti-corruption report and urged the countries of the European Union 
[EU] to effectively reinstate or implement the existing instruments to combat 
corruption. EC welcomes the establisment of the measures focused on corruption 
in the internal and external policies of the EU. Therefore, every two years, an 
anti-corruption report is going to be prepared and published, including trends 
and weaknesses that need to be addressed, to promote the exchange of best 
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practices. The Report will be based on the data from numerous and various 
sources including monitoring mechanisms, such as the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and United Nations, 
independent research experts, the European Anti-Fraud and Eurojust, Europol, the 
European Anti-Corruption Network, Member States Eurobarometer surveys, and 
civil society (European Commission, 2011b, 2014). In accordance with foregoing, 
the EC, a few months ago, released its first report and estimated that corruption 
costs us at least 120 billion EUR per year, which amounts to almost its annual 
budget, and acknowledged the current financial crisis to be result from a failure to 
control corruption risks, thus restricting corruption, which is one of the EU’s 2012 
priorities (Global Advice Network [GAN], 2013; European Commission, 2014). 
Acording to the estimates by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption 
(hereinafter: the CPC), the value of corruption in Slovenia is even higher and 
varies between 1.5 and 2.5 percent of GDP, reaching, on a large scale, almost five 
percent of the global GDP (Fajon, 2012). 
If we take a look at the previous research results by one of the foremost 
leading international preventive institutions or non-governmental organizations 
in fighting corruption, i.e., Transparency International, we get to the index of 
perception of corruption or Corruption Perception Index [CPI], which measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption in numerous countries and territories. 
The analysis of data shows that, between 2009 and 2013, Slovenia slided down the 
scale by 16 places (i.e. from the 27th to the 43rd place) (Transparency International, 
2013), as mentioned in one recent research on corruption in Slovenia. Namely, 
Dobovšek and Škrbec (2012) found that corruption in our country not only impacts 
the rule of law and the manner of people’s thinking or establishing certain values 
but also concluded that the most corrupt practices are actually promoted by those 
who are supposed to set an example of proper and honest attitude towards matters 
of public importance in all fields of social relations and processes. The foundations 
of moral and ethical values are indeed already violated by the individuals who 
should safeguard and expand or strengthen integrity.
According to Voliotis (2011: 555), “the authority is the main driver of corruption, 
but organizations need it for coordination”, and an independent media can be 
an important check on the arbitrary exercise of power by government if the 
government provides adequate information and the press is not controlled 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008). 
“Reporters without Borders 2013”1 (GAN, 2013) ranked Slovenia at the 
35th place (out of 179 countries), while the “Freedom House 2013” (GAN, 2013) 
ranked our country at the 40th place (out of 179 countries) and indicated the 
media environment as free, or “free”. “National Integrity Assessment in 2011” 
(GAN, 2013) states the independence of the media in Slovenia is at risk due to 
political, advertising, economic, and equity pressures, and the same report states 
that the Slovenian media, however, play an important role in the prevention and 
reporting of corruption. Nevertheless, the “Bertelsmann Foundation 2012” states 
1 See more at: GAN. Business Anti-Corruption Portal. Private Anti-Corruption Iniciatives. Retrieved 
from http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/Europe-central-asia/slovenia/
initiatives/private-anti-corruption-initiatives.aspx
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that the role of civil society organizations in Slovenia, despite their prolonged 
poor organization, already strengthens (GAN, 2013).
In 2004, Slovenia adopted two important strategic anti-corruption acts, i.e., the 
Resolution on the prevention of corruption in the Republic of Slovenia (Resolucija 
o preprečevanju korupcije v Republiki Sloveniji, 2004) and the Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Zakon o preprečevanju korupcije, 2004), but in the past ten years 
our country has not been as successful as it should have been. This area needs to 
enhance consensus on a common effort in fighting corruption, i.e., its prevention 
through implementation of preventive measures, which also refers to the IP.
Resolution on the prevention of corruption in the Republic of Slovenia 
(Resolucija o preprečevanju korupcije v Republiki Sloveniji, 2004) is actually 
not a legally binding regulation, but it strives for realistic, gradual, and prudent 
measures to tackle corruption. Its primary goals are preventively oriented, 
aiming at long-term and permanent elimination of the conditions generating 
and developing corruption, as well as at establishing an appropriate legal and 
institutional environment for preventing corruption and consistent enforcement 
of liability for illegal acts while establishing and reinstating a generally acceptable 
system of zero tolerance with regard to all corruption practices through various 
forms of education and with regard to the efficient use of internationally established 
standards in this area. For preventing, detecting and prosecuting corruption 
and successful implementing of anti-corruption measures, the assumptions 
arising from the the aforementioned resolution are significant, and they must 
be provided in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and be fully 
consistent with the Slovenian Constitution (Ustava Republike Slovnije, 1991), 
legislation, regulations, and international legal acts. It is necessary to highlight 
“the assumption” of “prevention before repression”, because previous reactions 
to the manifestations of corruption were highly repressive and, consequently, 
eliminated only the concequences instead of the causes of this social pathological 
phenomenon (Resolucija o preprečevanju korupcije v Republiki Sloveniji, 2004). 
The study conducted in the Netherlands and Slovenia in 2011 which 
examined the values  of the organization outlines that values of organizations in 
both countries show considerable similarities, in spite of the fact the corporate 
executives also rank accountability relatively lower in Slovenia than in the 
Netherlands. These findings lend support to the thesis that post-socialist transition 
in Slovenia has not yet led to a comprehensive change in the mindset of managers 
or organizational culture. Formal administrative reforms, new legislation, and 
EU membership are apparently not (yet) sufficient conditions for completing the 
europeanization of public and business sectors’ organizational culture (Jelovac, 
van der Wal, & Jelovac, 2011).
In April 2012, the CPC (Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije, 2012d) 
commissioned a study on quality of economic and business environment in the 
Republic of Slovenia conducted among Slovenian companies engaged in business 
activities. It was found out that the reasons a setback in competitiveness in the 
Republic of Slovenia derive from systemic corruption. Moreover, the CPC stated 
that systemic corruption in the Republic of Slovenia today is so ingrained that it 
may be regarded as structural. The “Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014” 
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(GAN, 2013) of the World Economic Forum ranks corruption among the top five 
most problematic factors for doing business in Slovenia; after gaining access to 
financing, inefficient government bureaucracy, restrictive labor market regulation 
and tax rates. However, the surveyed executives report that financial resources 
are rarely diverted due to corruption, and companies’ attitudes are considered 
to be relatively highly ethical. In addition to the above, investors are advised 
to carefully develop, implement, and enhance system integrity in investment 
management when operating in Slovenia. 
In dealing with organizational culture, ethics needs continually to be stressed 
and reinforced, and clear messages need to be communicated about which 
behaviors are acceptable and which are not. Excuses are often given for corrupt 
behaviors because there is no clear message about unacceptable or dubious 
behaviors (Graycar & Villa, 2011). They (Graycar & Villa, 2011: 17) also assert 
that “often, colleagues who transgress give the impression that their activities are what 
everybody does or have always done”. If there is no action against trensgressors, 
particularly if the behavior is widely known, then the organization has a culture 
problem. Workplace practices of good behavior need to be rewarded and 
celebrated and poor behavior penalized. Within an organization, anti-corruption 
culture needs to be reinforced with good personnel management and job design, 
reporting mechanisms for questionable behaviors, and no retribution against 
whistle-blowers. Robert Klitgaard’s famous formula C = M + D - A (corruption 
equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability) provides a basis for shaping 
culture and work activities (Graycar & Villa, 2011). Van Wart (2013) considers 
that ethic leadership requires not only clear principles and integrity but also, in 
the public sector and its high standards, a sense of duty, spirit, sustainability, 
and even sacrifice. Occasionally, such leadership tends to be built on superior 
self-knowledge and a sense of optimism infused with energy and perseverance. 
Many executives in recent scandals graduated from the most prestigious business 
schools. At this point it can be summarized that these scandals are not caused 
by executives’ lack of inteligence, but rather by their self-interests and a lack of 
wisdom, virtue or integrity, honesty, and character (Li, Ping, & His, 2012).
After it has been found that Slovenia is burdened by systemic or structural 
corruption, one of the national anti-corruption strategies undoubtedly becomes 
an effort to establish a most effective system of anti-corruption measures. As the 
current repressive reactions against corruption have not proven to be effective, it is 
necessary to adopt anti-corruption measures that are prevention-oriented. One of 
such measures is the IP, which represents a new ambitious national breakthrough 
in the field of prevention of corruption and requires a new mental approach within 
the implementation of working processes whose actual efficiency was verified by 
a conducted analysis and research. 
3 METHODS
According to an overview of the relevant literature, we conclude that no research 
or empirical survey has been done, at least according to the publicly available 
information. Therefore, we conducted a research to find out the Slovenian public 
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sector’s opinion, i.e., the IP producers and public sector expert’s standpoint, IP 
planners, or the CPC about the IP in the public sector with a focus on its efficiency. 
We chose qualitative research methods. Prior to the research, an analysis of the IP 
or examination of relevant domestic and foreign primary and secondary resources 
and legal, a review of the status of the IP as well as in-depth interviews with the 
IP producers and the CPC were done. The interviews took place in Slovenia in 
2013. Each interview lasted for a maximum of one hour and half. The interviews 
were conducted on the basis of a previous written request and permission of the 
organization (i.e. the leadership). 
A population unit consists of aproximatelly 2,000 IP producers and planners 
in Slovenia (N = 2,000), and we contacted 100 organizations. Our sample consists 
of 20 respondents (n = 20), as the rest did not agree on cooperation. We conducted 
convenience or an opportunity sample. The sample was generated by sending 
an e-mail request and full anonimity was guaranteed. The respondents were 
also assured that the information will be used in the aggregate form and for 
scientific purposes only. Prior to conducting the interview, a questionnaire or a 
list of questions was sent to the respondents, so that they could prepare for the 
interview.
Our efforts went in the direction of a respondent’s full expression; therefore, 
all questions were fully open, and this applies to both, IP planners (employees of 
CPC) and IP producers. The questions were asked only by employees working in 
the scope of integrity or prevention of corruption. The answers were handwritten 
and the interviews were not recorded and transcribed or coded, as we assumed 
that the respondents prefer to participate in the research in such a way, especially 
when taking into account the nature of the topic.
Throughout the research period, special attention was paid to objectivity, and 
we tried to be nonpartisan. As regards validity of the gathered data, we can say 
that several indicators on the same variable were used, which means that more 
substantive domains of theoretical concepts were covered, as we tried to avoid 
systematic inaccuracy. In terms of reliability or repeatability of measurements, 
it can be said that we are going to conduct the research again, and an alternative 
form of a method and internal consistency method will be used. 
4 OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
Originally, a deadline for the submission of the IP for the IP producers was June 
5, 2011, but due to the novel of the Integrity and prevention of corruption Act 
the latter was extended for one more year, i.e., until June 5, 2012 (Komisija za 
preprečevanje korupcije, 2012c). By that time, the IP producers in Slovenia were 
obliged to elaborate their IPs, or in short, they were supposed to do an assessment 
of institution’s corruption exposure and a plan of the measures for timely 
detection, prevention, and elimination of the risks of corruption and submit it to 
the CPC. 
During the extended time, the CPC carried out lots of workshops, lectures, 
and open days (i.e., by March 2012, more than a hundred such events were 
organized), and extensive experience was shared between the CPC and the IP 
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producers. Within the time of examination and counting the submitted IPs, the 
CPC encountered problems due to a failure to update the information on the IP 
producer’s changes concerning the legal status forms of organizations due to 
reorganization or transformation of the structure of organizations. For instance, 
some IP producers ceased to exist or got united, renamed or they changed their 
legal status form or structure of the organization, so the final number of the 
relevant IP producers was changing over the time.2
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the focus here was on April 2012 (i.e., two 
months before the deadline). As we can see below, the table 1 shows that little 
more than half or 1,032 IP producers out of 1,965 submitted the IP. However, 
the situation changed by the deadline (i.e., by June 5, 2012), which means that 
the number of submitted IPs most likely increased. Nonetheless, we were not 
interested in that date, but in that in April, i.e., an interim period.
No.
&
Pct. or 
%
The IP producers by 
groups
Submitted IP
(No.)
Non-
submitted 
IP
(No.)
Submitted IP
(Pct. or %)
Non-
submitted 
IP (Pct. or 
%)
1 Courts
(24)
23 1 95.83 4.17
2 Admin. units
(58)
53 5 91.38 8.62
3 Protection work. 
centres
(20)
18 2 90.00 10.00
4 Centres for social work
(62)
54 8 87.09 12.91
5 Homes for the elderly
(57)
38 19 66.67 33.33
6 Government services 
(17)
12 5 70.59 29.41
7 Nurseries
(108)
76 32 70.37 29.63
8 People’s universities 
(27)
19 8 70.37 29.63
9 Inspectorates
(14)
9 5 64.28 35.72
10 Independent and sove-
reign state bodies
(11)
7 4 63.64 36.36
11 Pharmacies
(24)
15 9 62.50 37.50
12 Hospitals
(24)
15 9 62.50 37.50
13 Helth centres
(57)
35 22 61.40 38.60
14 Primary schools (474) 284 190 59.91 40.09
2 An assertion acquired by the competent employees for the IP at the CPC in Republic of Slovenia on 15th 
March 2013.
Table 1: 
Review of the 
IP, April 2012, 
Source: the CPC 
(Komisija za 
preprečevanje 
korupcije, 
2012a)
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No.
&
Pct. or 
%
The IP producers by 
groups
Submitted IP
(No.)
Non-
submitted 
IP
(No.)
Submitted IP
(Pct. or %)
Non-
submitted 
IP (Pct. or 
%)
15 Ministries and consti-
tuent bodies (41)
24 17 58.54 41.46
16 Prosecutions
(12)
7 5 58.33 41.67
17 Helth institutions       
(14)
8 6 57.14 42.86
18 Music schools
(52)
29 23 55.77 44.23
19 Public funds
(18)
10 8 55.55 44.45
20 Secondary schools 
(123)
58 65 47.15 52.85
21 Homes for pupils and 
students
(18)
8 10 44.44 55.56
22 Municipalities
(211)
86 125 40.76 59.24
23 Agencies
(37)
15 22 40.54 59.46
24 Museums, galleries, 
archives and parks (79)
32 47 40.51 59.49
25 Institutes
(22)
7 15 31.82 68.18
26 Other public institu-
tions
(221)
70 151 31.67 68.33
27 Public institutions for 
sport
(44)
10 34 22.73 77.27
28 Universities, faculties 
and colleges
(35)
5 30 14.28 85.72
29 Libraries
(63)
5 58 7.94 92.06
Tog. 1,965 1,032 935
As the table reveals, the approximate number of the IP producers obliged 
to elaborate the IP in Slovenia is 1,965 (data refer to April 2012), and they are 
divided into the following groups: courts, administrative units, protection 
working centres, centres for social work, homes for the elderly, government 
service, nurseries, people’s universities, inspectorates, independent and sovereign 
state bodies, pharmacies, hospitals, helth centres, primary schools, ministries and 
constituent bodies, prosecutions, helth institutions, music schools, public funds, 
secondary schools, homes for pupils and students, municipalities, agencies, 
museums, galleries, archives and parks, institutes, other public institutions, public 
institutions for sport, universities, faculties and colleges and libraries. 
Table 1: 
continuation
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5 FINDINGS
With regard to the issue at hand, aversion or unwillingness of IP producers to 
participate in our research was found, generally. However, the detailed results 
of the research not only show that the current concept of IP should be partially 
upgraded, but they also reveal that only few leading employees participate in 
elaborating their IP. In the following, some more detailed findings can be observed 
as well.
First, the great majority of them (87%) stated that they are already preoccupied 
and understaffed; therefore, the IP mostly burdened them considerably. In this 
respect, the respondents also answered that the Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju korupcije, 2011) – which is 
actually a legal framework for producing the IP – did not implement only the IP, 
but also established other new scopes, such as conflict of interests, restrictions on 
operations and gifts, functions incompatibility, anti-corruption clause, property 
registration, lobbying, etc., which consequently dictated lots of previously not 
known legal concepts and demanded an additional liabilities and responsibilities. 
To sum up, the IP initially burdened the public servants heavily whereat we 
are aware that our sample is small, therefore, the conclusions, in particular, 
generalization is not appropriate – which actually applies to all following findings. 
Second, in most cases (84%) the respondents find the IP beneficial as well 
as viable and necessary preventive anti-corruption measure for strengthening 
usefulness of integrity in Slovenia, and they undoubtedly welcome and support 
it; however, in the form and the manner set at this phase (i.e., in the time of 
conducting research, not now), it is perceived more as a static document rather 
than a dynamic process. They also stated that “there is too much unnecessary 
administrative tasking within its elaborating”. Thus, the IP was found slightly 
inelastic or exhaustive, particularly in terms of its usability. Furthermore, 
upgrading and refining of the IP were proposed, particularly in terms of its IT 
support or automation. The respondents suggested reminder’s implementation 
and the establishment of a centralized and uniform environment for all of the 
IP producers. Hence, “we could be daily interactive when dealing with the 
IP”. Moreover, they also recommended establishing “internal integrity or 
anti-corruption communication network”, so that the employees could be daily 
acquainted with the content arising from strengthening of the utility of integrity, 
“we could identify, and cope as well as deter corruption more effectively”. In a 
nutshell, the current IP is a beneficial as well as a viable and necessary preventive 
anti-corruption measure, but it is not applicable and effective enough and should 
be upgraded. 
Third, as already mentioned, elaborating the IP merely concerned 
already burdened employees but not “the leading ones”. In this context, the 
respondents argued that the “non leading employees” have no direct influence on 
decision-making, such as their superiors or executives; therefore, “it is necessary 
the latter participate in increasing or enhancing the organization’s utility of 
integrity”. The respondents answered that their executives should be primarily 
engaged in strengthening the integrity processes (i.e., in elaborating the IP), and 
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“it is not even necessary they directly produce it, they may be, for instance, just 
sent to a training in a similar content also referring to the IP”. “It is essential the 
executives hear and listen to such content as many times as possible, because 
only that way they will consider the IP elaborating process more seriously and 
understand how much time it actually takes.” The respondends conclude the 
executives do not show any particular interest in their IP or its contents at all. In 
short, the leadership, in principle, did not participate in producing the IP, which 
has been found inappropriate. 
Fourth, employees from a wide range of a job descriptions were considered 
for IP custodians (i.e., within the range “Adviser III” – “Secretary” levels), which 
presents a huge difference and inequality in terms a particular public servant’s 
salary. In facts, it means that there can even be a 16 salary-grade difference (i.e., 
from 28th to 44th), and it was observed that in some organizations the IP custodians 
are, as a result of their job description, already mainly engaged in working 
procesess related to quality evaluation, which, indeed, coincides with the content 
of the IP; however, on the other hand, there were employees to whoom the IP 
was simply added to the existing/quite a different/or regular job description and 
tasks. A finding resulting thereof is improper or unbalanced delegation of tasks 
according to various salary grades of the IP producers. 
Fifth, the biggest issue at hand was to define corruption procedures of 
risks, and the smallest was to determine the measures for their reduction. Some 
respondents stated that defining the corruption procedures of risks was a big issue 
for them, because they had never faced or assessed, theoretically, a corruption 
risk before, and determining the right measures seemed, for example, a logical 
consequence.
Sixth, the IP was significantly well accepted by the “centralized” IP producers 
or state authorities but much less by the “decentralized” IP producers, i.e., 
municipalities, (public) agencies, institutions, funds, public economic institutions, 
centers, schools, etc., but we did not find the reasons why.
Seventh, the IP were not internalized, especially by those IP producers who 
have a small number of employees and elementary schools. Here, once more, we 
did not manage to obtain any direct answers to determine why, as the latter most 
strongly refused to participate in our research. 
Eight, when elaborating their IP, IP producers said that they had already 
assessed risks three times i.e., according to the Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju korupcije, 2011), the Public 
Finance Act (Zakon o javnih financah, 2011), and the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act (Zakon o varnosti in zdravju pri delu, 2011); therefore, nearly two 
thirds of respondents called for consideration to merge the issue of risks. The 
participants pointed out that they have to assess risks, although different, three 
times per year. Therefore, they suggested combining all legally binding risk 
assessments under one regulation/law.
Further, more than half of the respondents emphasized that it would be 
necessary to establish the IP in the private sector as well, especially in banks.
Moreover, it was found that the task requires considerable recognition of the 
diligence, commitment, effort, contribution, support and assistance by the CPC’s 
employees responsible for the scope of integrity, especially where there are few 
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such employees with regard to an extremely large number of the IP producers: 
only three CPC employees and almost 2,000 IP producers. In fact, the respondents 
appraised engagement and support of the CPC as appropriate and satisfactory, 
some even assessed the functioning of the CPC as more than satisfactory, but most 
of them assessed it as professional and accurate.
Finally, in the next phase (i.e., after examining all of the IPs), communication 
or a contact between the CPC and IP producers is expected (e.g., organization and 
acomplishment of seminars, trainings, exposure to examples of good practices 
where the IP producers could discuss the issues resulting from the IP, discussions 
about the modification and upgrading of the existing integrity utility, etc.).
As regards the IP planners’ findings, we can summarize that it is the CPC’s 
standpoint that it is crucial that every employee in the public sector is engaged in 
elaborating the IP, and what’s more, this right and duty has arisen from the law. 
The CPC also considers that the IP could be partially upgraded.
6 DISCUSSION
When dealing with corruption, we should pay attention to choose appropriate 
measures, as the literature review (Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije, 2014; 
Resolucija o preprečevanju korupcije v Republiki Sloveniji, 2004; UNODC, 2004) 
on corruption showed that the most effective and comprehensive ones are those 
aimed at its prevention. For instance, the 3rd chapter of the the aforementioned 
resolution states that just repressive response to corruption leads only to the 
removal of harmful consequences in individual cases, while the causes, motives 
and circumstances determining the occurrence of corruption remain intact. 
Not only because of explicit global trends, but also due to greater efficiency 
and effectiveness of preventive action, the basic premise for the content and 
implementation of Slovenian anti-corruption measures are prevention, detection 
causes and conditions for corruption and […], while repressive function continues 
to be a corrective, useful for sanctioning illegal practices. 
This paper has covered a considerable scope of anti-corruption measures 
concerned with the Slovenian case, or more precisely, with the IP project. As a 
matter of fact, the IP is one of the modern preventive anti-corruption measures or 
tool which aims at strenghtening integrity, and our country recently adopted it. 
In other words, it is actually called a successful national breakthrough in the area 
of prevention of corruption, for Slovenia is the first in the European Union to have 
implemented it.
As Dobovšek (2006) claims, the essence of every strengthening of integrity 
should not stem in bureaucratisation, but in awareness, intellectual awakening 
or genuine understanding of positive impacts and effects of integrity on the 
organization, as well as in strong opposition to corrupt, unethical, and unlawful 
behaviour or risks, and this especially applies to leadership. 
Due to the fact that our research involved a relatively low number of 
participants, it can be observed that findings cannot be generalized to the whole 
population or to all the IP producers obliged to elaborete the IP. According to 
the foregoing, the results of the research have shown that Slovenia did accept the 
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IP, but, on the other hand, the respondents already suggested its upgrading, or 
more precisely, they proposed its automation and simplification of thereto related 
procedures for its elaboration, and the CPC partly agrees with the proposal. The 
research has also revealed that leadership did not participate in elaborating the 
IP, which is particularly worrying, as the CPC experts (Komisija za preprečevanje 
korupcije, 2012b) stressed that integrity of organization should be built from “top 
to bottom”. Therefore, organizing and executing seminars, trainings, discussions, 
workshops, round tables, public forums, etc., where the leadership of Slovenian 
public sector and the CPC (as well as the IP producers or the custodians, if 
necessary) could discuss the content with regard to the IP and where examples of 
good practices would be exchanged, are highly recommended. The IP producers 
also suggested unifying the job title/description for the IP custodians (e.g., “The 
custodian of the IP and quality management”), which would actually imply 
the same payment for the task for all IP custodians, as well. This is definitely 
a proposal worthy of consideration at the national level, referring to the entire 
Slovenian public sector.
In conclusion, we could say the Slovenian IP project is, in principle, an 
important step in the direction of strengthening the integrity of our public sector, 
but the solution for its efficiency lies in upgrading the current phase or/and the 
concept that actually relates to simplification, automation, and changing mentality 
of leadership.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Slovenia should continue with the IP project, 
for our national integrity in recent years is not exactly where we would want 
it; therefore, one of the objectives of the current government is to advocate for 
preventive measures in fighting corruption, even if it fails to bring immediate 
financial yields. 
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